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Introduction
North American cities are infamous for their sprawling built environment, characterized by 
low-density housing, large networks of  roadways, single-use zoning, and a reliance on the 
automobile.  Sprawling single-use residential districts have been argued to endorse private 
over public space, while lacking the vibrancy of  pedestrian parks, community hubs, or easily 
accessible marketplaces (Doucet, 2007).  Urban sprawl is also increasingly linked to energy 
and resource use, and thus climate change (Burda, 2008).  Critics of  urban sprawl argue its 
incompatibility with environmental, economic, or social sustainability.
Supporters of  sprawling developments, largely unable to counter the aforementioned argu-
ments, provide alternate rationale against regulating sprawl.  They label such regulation as 
social engineering, in which politicians and planners should not engage (GOHBA, 2010, p. 
1).  They further assert such regulation as contrary to consumer choice, or the free market, 
exacerbating housing shortages in the urban core.  Developers have demonstrated obvious 
success (judging from the present landscape) in leverage these arguments through strong 
lobbies, and litigation professionals.
Between 1971 and 1996, Canada’s urbanized land area increased by 77% despite Canada’s 
urban population increasing by only 37% (Bunting, Filion, & Priston, 2002).  From 2001 to 
2006, the populations in the suburban areas of  the 33 census metropolitan areas grew at 
double the national average (Tindal & Tindal, 2009, p. 73).  Because land-use planning is 
under shared provincial-municipal jurisdiction, the federal government has been unwilling 
and unable to enforce land-use policies to contain this pattern of  sprawl (Robinson, 2009, p. 
155).
In the Canadian context, nowhere has urban sprawl been worse than in Ontario.  The loss 
of  Ontario farmland to development is particularly concerning because Ontario hosts the 
best agricultural land in the country - over 21,000 km2 of  class 1 farmland - more than the 
rest of  Canada combined (Sierra Club, 2003, p. 9).  Since 1981, Ontario has lost nearly 
5,000km2 of  prime farmland.  Ontario’s best farmland overlaps almost directly with On-
tario’s most urbanized areas, which includes both the Greater Golden Horseshoe Area 
(GGH) and the Ottawa Area.  In 1967, over 62% of  the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) was 
class 1-3 farmland.  In 1997, this figure had dropped to 44% (Sierra Club, 2003, p. 10).  An 
increasingly populated urban region is thus losing the capacity to feed itself.  The continu-
ous transformation of  such lands threatens not only ecosystem resilience, but human secu-
rity, as it compromises the ability of  present and future generations to grow food in close 
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At present, Ontario’s municipalities are largely aware of  the relationship between the aforementioned problems and urban sprawl.   
They further realize that in addition to the less tangible social and environmental costs, municipalities bear substantial cost burdens in build-
ing and maintaining infrastructure to sprawling suburbs, upon which the expanded property tax base will not cover (City of  Ottawa, 2003, 
p. 73).  While Ontario’s municipalities have had to deal with the consequences of  urban sprawl, they face immense difficulties challenging 
aggressive land development, despite being the primary locus of  land-use decisions.
Sprawl has continued in Ontario under the auspice of  the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB), a provincial body with oversight on mu-
nicipal land use decisions.  Many opponents of  sprawl argue the present state of  Ontario’s sprawling built environment has been the result 
of  the cumulative pro-developer decisions at the OMB.  This, among other factors, spurred calls for an overhaul of  this institution, with the 
issue culminating in 2003 in the face of  residential developments on Southern Ontario’s ecologically critical Oak Ridges Moraine.  It was in 
these circumstances that Dalton McGuinty’s liberal party was first elected, with a platform committing to reform of  the OMB.  The evolu-
tion and effectiveness of  such reform, as it relates to urban sprawl, will be a key theme of  this paper.
This paper maintains that oversight mechanisms are not inherently counter-democratic or environmentally regressive.  However, this 
paper reveals the recent difficultly in the design of  oversight mechanisms for urban sprawl that are both accountable and effective.  This 
paper asserts that, in Ontario, McGuinty’s slate of  “reforms” actually constitute an additional oversight body, while the OMB, as the origi-
nal oversight body, has largely been retained in its original form.  Although these newer policies have been explicitly designed to control 
urban sprawl, these policies have incomplete and deficient geographic coverage.  When the old and new oversight mechanisms are taken 
together, they systematically contradict one another, leading to sprawl - particularly in regions of  the province where policy coverage is defi-
cient. 
 Provincial oversight mechanisms: The Old and the New
The present provincial oversight mechanisms for municipal land-use decisions comprise the OMB, as well as a number of  policies put 
in place after the election of  the McGuinty government in 2003.  This paper divides these into two separate oversight mechanisms - old and 
new.  The rationale for this organizational division becomes evident within the context how these institutions and policies came into force in 
Ontario’s recent history.
The Ontario Municipal Board and its criticisms
The OMB is a long-standing adjudicative tribunal that has survived and evolved in Ontario over more than a century.  In the few dec-
ades prior to 2003, the OMB’s mandate has been relatively stable.   The OMB exists as the venue for appeals against municipal land-use 
decisions, including planning applications, zoning bylaws, and planning related documents such as municipal Official Plans (Ministry of  
Municipal Affairs and Housing, 2010, p. 2).  Appeals are brought forward by businesses, community groups, individuals, and most notably, 
developers.  Land developers have learned to use the OMB to overturn municipal planning decisions which were unfavourable to their ob-
jectives.  Developers are able to leverage huge legal resources and expert testimonies, often against financially constrained municipalities or 
community groups that rely primarily on voluntarism.  Stephen Hamilton, of  Dalhousie University, performed an empirical analysis of  past 
OMB rulings and confirmed what community groups and municipalities have long suspected - that the OMB has a tendency to favour de-
velopers (Hamilton, 2007, p. 91).  Aaron Moore, in his study focusing on Toronto, revealed that between 2000 and 2006, the OMB awarded 
favourable decisions to developers 64% of  the time (Moore, 2009, p. 9).  In this same period, neighbourhood associations participated in 77 
appeals, winning just five favourable decisions (6.5%).  Adjudication patterns at the OMB have effectively disrupted the efforts by other 
actors to prevent urban sprawl.
In the 1990s, the NDP government established the Commission on Planning and Development Reform.  A key recommendation pro-
duced by the Commission and accepted by government, was that municipal decisions regarding land-use had to be “consistent with” gov-
ernment planning and policy statements (Legislative Assembly of  Ontario, 2004, pp. G-465).  This modest but critical attempt at curbing 
sprawl was undone in 1997, two years into PC Premier Mike Harris’ pro-development “Common Sense Revolution”.
The Sierra Club of  Canada published a damning assessment of  these Harris era policies in its February 2003 report, entitled Sprawl 
Hurts Us All.  Their report dismissed Harris’ self-proclaimed Smart Growth policies as a greenwash that was inherently pro-development.  
Municipalities no longer had to be “consistent with” solid policies, but only had to “have regard for” a general “Provincial Policy State-
ment”.  The Harris government modified the Planning Act to loosen regulations and eliminate citizen participation from the planning proc-
ess (Sierra Club, 2003, p. 18).  Furthermore, it eliminated intervener funding for appeals (Sierra Club, 2003, p. 20).  Sierra Club’s report 
cited several examples of  citizens’ coalitions and municipalities battling sprawl at the OMB, not only losing, but being hit with SLAPP  (stra-
tegic litigation against public participation) lawsuits over developers’ legal costs.  They list many examples:  In one instance, developers in 
Collingwood were awarded $500,000 from the town itself.  In yet another example, the community group “Save the Rouge River”, was 
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asked to pay $10,000 in developers’ legal expenses after they lost their appeal, despite spending $20,000 on their own legal fees (Sierra Club, 
2003, p. 21).
Harris’ second term in office coincided with huge development battles around the Oak Ridges Moraine, an environmentally sensitive 
area critical for groundwater recharge in Southern Ontario.  The Town of  Richmond Hill, containing a southern portion of  the moraine, 
spent $1M defending their decisions against developers who were estimated to have spent $15M in court.  Between 2000 and 2001, munici-
palities in the GTA spent more than $20M in total defending their land-use decisions at the OMB (Shular, 2002).  These legal fees are sig-
nificant considering that capital budgets of  smaller municipalities may only be a few million dollars (Sierra Club, 2003, p. 20).  Mike Colle, 
Liberal MPP for Eglington-Lawrence and outspoken critic of  the OMB, pleaded for the passage of  a Private Members’ Bill abolishing the 
OMB’s role in granting developments on the moraine, stating that “The OMB should not be deciding the future of  our fish, our wildlife 
and our communities.” (Legislative Assembly of  Ontario, 2000, p. 4092)
Growing public consciousness regarding the loss of  the Oak Ridges Moraine increased pressures on the government to end its compla-
cency with sprawling development.  In 2001, the Harris government passed the Oak Ridges Moraine Conservation Act (ORMCA), which 
marked a provincial return to regional planning after three decades of  absence (Wekerle & Abbruzzese, 2009, p. 587).  However, the 
ORMCA was fraught with loopholes, making little impact in slowing the rate of  development on the Moraine, and doing nothing to change 
decisions at the OMB.  In the lead up to the October election campaign, the protection of  the Oak Ridges Moraine became one of  the key 
issues for residents in the GTA, most notably suburban voters (Eidelman, 2010).  
In addition to the criticisms levied against the Harris government, The Sierra Club blasted the institution of  the OMB, citing their 
decisions as “one of  the leading causes of  urban sprawl, especially in Southern Ontario.” (Sierra Club, 2003, p. 20)  Sierra Club’s recom-
mendations were as follows:
Abolish the OMB, replacing it with a new appeals board
Prevent that appeals board from overturning municipal urban boundary decisions
Train board members around issues relating to urban sprawl
Reinstate intervener funding to community groups
Establish enforceable urban growth boundaries for all Ontario towns and cities
Ontario’s New Policies
In his campaign for provincial election, Liberal candidate Dalton McGuinty pledged a commitment to reign in urban sprawl, specifi-
cally stating that he would halt development on the Oak Ridges Moraine and stop a highly controversial development project for some 
6,600 houses.  Developers, fearing impending regulation, accelerated their development applications and housing construction in an at-
tempt to lock-in their development plans.  The Toronto Star reported that there were “[noise] complaints from area residents that graders 
started working 24-hours a day in response to McGuinty’s announcement.” (Funston, 2003)
On October 2nd, 2003, Dalton McGuinty and the Liberal Party swept the provincial election, forming a majority government (CBC, 
2003).  In the three weeks between the election and McGuinty’s inauguration, Toronto Star reporters again visited the site of  the controver-
sial development.   They reported that within this time span, these developers ramped up promotion via billboards while continuing to ag-
gressively sell houses (Funston, 2003).
  A mere two weeks into his term, an embarrassed McGuinty failed to make good on his high-profile election promise to block the 
construction of  the 6,600 homes.  After weighing an estimated one billion dollar price tag in litigation from the developers, McGuinty 
stated, "We're trying to make the best of  a bad situation.  The developers have, in fact, acquired some legally enforceable rights.” (Mackie, 
2003)  This illustrated the problem that continues today - that once suburban land development rights have been permitted, these rights are 
difficult to rescind (Robinson, 2009, p. 160).  In the wake of  McGuinty’s inauguration, and prior to official releases of  improved land-use 
planning legislation, developers continued to aggressively use the OMB to appeal decisions that restricted urban boundary expansion and/
or developments.
The release of  carefully crafted and consultation-based legislation and policy proved to take some time.  In May of  2004, Dalton 
McGuinty “fired a warning shot at developers” - as The Globe and Mail’s John Barber described it, in reference to the first report from 
McGuinty’s Greenbelt Task Force (Barber, 2004).  Within hours of  its release, David Donnelly, lawyer for Environmental Defense, slammed 
it onto the desk at a critical OMB hearing in Richmond Hill that would decide the fate of  607 hectares within the greenbelt study area.
"We told [the government] two months ago that they had to come out by May 14 or else we were going to have to pull out the bunny 
suits and say, 'You guys are not committed,’ [but as of  now] they've done everything they said they would." - David Donnelly, Environmen-
tal Defense Canada
The Greenbelt Task Force report marked the onset of  what others would later call the “boldest attempt to address urban sprawl in 
Canada, and arguably North America.” (Eidelman, 2010, p. 27)  The barrage of  legislation and policies produced by the McGuinty gov-
ernment (shown in the following table) have been outlined and critiqued by Cherise Burda of  the Pembina Institute, in the 2008 progress 
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report entitled “Getting Tough on Urban Sprawl.”  Ontario’s new policies have been explicitly designed to control urban sprawl and pre-
serve agricultural and natural lands.  Two elements of  these policies, the Greenbelt Act and the Places to Grow Act, have targeted specific 
regions, in effect creating an oversight mechanism preventing municipalities from authorizing urban sprawl.  However, these acts have in-
complete and deficient coverage.  Regions not covered by these acts are guided by other Ontario policies - broad policy statements as well as 
the Strong Communities (Planning Amendment) Act (Bill 26), designed to empower public interest and prevent appeals of  municipal deci-




Legislation that establishes a 240,000-hectare greenbelt in the GGH within which urban 
development will not be permitted.
The Greenbelt Plan
effective December 2004
The specific goals and policies intended to enact the Greenbelt Act.  Applies to the Greater 
Golden Horseshoe area.
The Places to Grow Act
introduced October 2004
A legal provincial framework to coordinate planning and decision making for long-term 
growth and infrastructure renewal in Ontario. It gives the Province the power to designate 
geographical growth areas and to require municipalities to bring their official plans into 
conformity with the growth plan for their area.
Provincial Policy Statement (PPS)
revised March 2005
Revised planning rules that allow development only in areas where it can be sustained and 
supported by infrastructure. These include new policies to support intensification, more 
transit friendly land use patterns, stronger direction on land use policies for improved air 
quality and alternative and renewable energy.
Strong Communities (Planning 
Amendment) Act, 2004
effective March 2005
Legislation that requires planning decisions on applications subject to the new PPS “shall be 
consistent with” the new policies. It allows more time and opportunity for public scrutiny in 
the planning process.
Growth Plan for the Greater Golden 
Horseshoe
released June 2006
A designated growth plan under The Places to Grow Act.  It is a plan to delineate and set 
policy for where and how growth/development can occur in the GGH, including the identi-




The Planning and Conservation Land Statute Law Amendment Act, establishing local ap-
peal bodies to hear appeals as an alternative to the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB).
Growth Plan for Northern Ontario
released March 2011
Another designated growth plan under The Places to Grow Act.  Less focused on urban 
sprawl than the GGH plan.
*Adapted from (Burda, 2008; Robinson, 2009; Ontario Ministry of  Infrastructure, 2011).
The Implications of  Ontario’s New Policies
Several of  the above listed pieces of  legislation have relevance only to particular regions of  the province.  The Greenbelt Act and its 
Greenbelt Plan are only relevant to municipalities within the Greater Golden Horseshoe.  The Places to Grow Act mandates that the prov-
ince, in consultation with the public and municipalities, prepare province-wide regional growth plans that, among other objectives, curb 
urban sprawl.  So far, only two growth plans have been released: one for the Greater Golden Horseshoe, and one for Northern Ontario.  
While these two plans encompass the majority of  Ontario’s land mass, they leave out many other regions that are challenged with reigning 
in urban sprawl.  The remaining policies listed in the table above have therefore had to suffice in directing and empowering municipalities 
to prevent urban sprawl.  These remaining policies have implications for OMB decision making, and thus, constitute a sort of  reform to 
both the OMB and the Planning Act.
The Planning Act, legislated in 1990, establishes the rules for land-use planning in Ontario and “describes how land uses may be con-
trolled, and who can control them.” (Ministry of  Municipal Affairs and Housing, 2010)  The McGuinty government reinstated the text in 
the Planning Act that required land-use planning, including decisions made by the OMB, to “be consistent” with a now strengthened Pro-
vincial Policy Statement (PPS).  The Planning Act grants the authority to issue the PPS to the Ministry of  Municipal Affairs (Environmental 
ISSUE #2  MAY 2011
THE EVOLUTION AND CONTRADICTION OF ONTARIO’S LAND-USE OVERSIGHT MECHANISMS 
AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR URBAN SPRAWL 4
Comissioner of  Ontario, 2005, pp. 39-46).  This new PPS was designed to curb sprawl, and emphasizes intensification and minimum densi-
ties, mixed-use development to reduce travel needs and traffic congestion, required minimum standards for planning authorities, and estab-
lished provincial plans.
Under the Strong Communities (Planning Amendment) Act, the Minister of  Municipal Affairs can declare a provincial interest in an 
appeal before the OMB if  that minister believes it affects a matter of  provincial interest.  Once declared, the OMB’s decision is non-binding 
until it is confirmed by cabinet.  If  a provincial interest has been declared, cabinet is not obligated to adhere to the 2005 PPS (Environmen-
tal Comissioner of  Ontario, 2005, pp. 39-46).  When introducing this legislation at Queen’s Park, John Gerretson, then Minister of  Munici-
pal Affairs, stated that:
“planning reform would give the province the option to exercise authority on significant matters that affect provincial interests. It 
would provide the province with the authority to confirm, vary or rescind an OMB decision if  it adversely affects a declared provincial in-
terest regarding official plans and zoning.” (Legislative Assembly of  Ontario, 2004, pp. G-463)
NDP opposition member Julia Munroe expressed her concerns regarding the accountability aspect of  this legislation, calling it a 
“double-edged sword”, inquiring as to “what kind of  checks and balances are in place by cabinet?” (Legislative Assembly of  Ontario, 2004, 
pp. G-465)  Gerretson responded by saying that the powers to overrule an OMB decision have always existed, but have only been used in 
four instances in the past, and that he had no intention of  abusing these powers in the future (Legislative Assembly of  Ontario, 2004, pp. G-
467).
In Burda’s assessments of  Ontario’s new policies, she notes while they afford greater decision-making authority to municipalities, mu-
nicipalities need not do anything more than to “conform to broad policy, which [presently] allows for 60% of  development in greenfields, 
resulting in sprawl.” (Burda, 2008, p. 22)  However, she also advocates for municipalities to have even greater decision-making authority, 
which although “democratic”, could in many instances serve to aggravate the aforementioned problem.  Burda’s additional recommenda-
tions include reforms to the OMB, paralleling recommendations made by the Sierra Club five years earlier.  She advocates that the OMB 
appointment process be modified such that new openings are subject to an open call for qualified candidates, reviewed by a non-partisan 
advisory committee, and selected by the Attorney General.  She also calls for the re-establishment of  intervener funding for advocates of  the 
public interest (Burda, 2008, p. 42).
Drawing conclusions as to the degree of  success of  Ontario’s new and often complex policies are both difficult and contentious.  Burda 
hesitates to make such a conclusion, instead stating that “the effects of  this legislation will need to be understood over time” (Burda, 2008, p. 
39).
Conclusion
Although the Ontario government committed to a reform of  the OMB, the additional legislations and policies that were meant to 
bring about this reform have clearly not been realized in practice.  This is especially true in municipalities which fall outside both planning 
areas of  Ontario’s Greenbelt Act and Places to Grow Act.  This implies that a partial remedy can be found by deploying additional growth 
plans under the Places to Grow Act to cover the remaining regions of  the province.
While the Minister of  Municipal Affairs has the authority to intervene in the OMB appeals process if  it is deemed a matter of  provin-
cial interest, this power has yet to be exercised in preventing an urban sprawl development.  A case could arise whereby the Minister could 
intervene to “save” municipalities on a case-by-case basis.  While this tactic may win a particular battle, it is a double-edged-sword.  Using 
the same powers afforded under Ontario’s new policies, a subsequent government simply has to change the text of  the Provincial Policy 
Statement, or state a provincial interest prior to an OMB hearing, and that Minister can decide the outcome of  any land-use adjudication.  
Such future Provincial Policy Statements or declared provincial interests are not required to be in-line with curbing sprawl, and present an 
opportunity to be used for ominous ends.  As such, requesting Ministerial intervention at the OMB may set a precedent for rampant inter-
vention by any subsequent governments, including those not concerned with urban sprawl.
Affording final say in land-use decisions to municipalities is also no guaranteed solution to urban sprawl.  As evidenced by statistics on 
developer campaign contributions to councillors, it may be the case where council pushes through a pro-development agenda.  In comment 
submissions on the Strong Communities Act, the Ontario’s Environmental Commissioner’s Office concedes this point, stating that:
“the transfer of  final decision-making powers from the OMB to municipal councils may be positive when municipalities are progressive 
in their approaches to land use planning - but potentially problematic when they are not.” (Environmental Comissioner of  Ontario, 2005, 
pp. 36-39)
Despite this possibility, many environmental organizations like The Pembina Institute and Sierra Club continue to advocate for these 
strengthened decision making powers at the municipal level, while at the same time advocating stronger direction from the provincial gov-
ernment.  This paradox is highly illustrative of  the difficulty in provincial oversight mechanisms that attempt to further a particular policy 
direction.  Unless sustainable development is fortified as a non-partisan issue, it is unreasonable to expect long-term continuity in provincial 
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oversight that will effectively prevent sprawl.  To achieve this, principles of  sustainable development must be embedded not just in legisla-
tion, but in the constitution.
The OMB, as a historic institution, may just be experiencing bureaucratic inertia.  With time, board members should eventually be 
replaced by competent planners familiar with sustainable land-use policies and the problems associated with urban sprawl.  With 8-year 
board member terms, such institutional change will be slow, and in that time, the natural lands will continue to be lost to concrete and 
pavement.
References
Barber, J. (2004, May 15). McGuinty fires a warning shot at developers - just in time. Retrieved March 25, 2011, from The Globe and 
Mail: http://www.cope-nomph.org/news/news-15-05-04.shtml
Bunting, T., Filion, P., & Priston, H. (2002). Density Gradients in Canadian Metropolitan Regions, 1971-96: Differential Patterns of  
Central Area and Suburban Growth and Change. Urban Studies , 39.
Burda, C. (2008). Getting Tough on Urban Sprawl - Solutions to meet Ontario climate change targets. Toronto: The Pembina Insti-
tute.
CBC. (2003, October 2). Ontario Votes 2003. Retrieved March 25, 2011, from Canadian Broadcasting Corporation: 
http://www.cbc.ca/ontariovotes2003/
City of  Ottawa. (2003). Ottawa 2020: Environmental Strategy for the City of  Ottawa. Ottawa.
Doucet, C. (2007). Urban Meltdown. Gabriola Island: New Society Publishers.
Eidelman, G. (2010). Managing Urban Sprawl in Ontario: Good Policy or Good Politics? Politics & Policy , 38 (6), 1211-1236.
Environmental Comissioner of  Ontario. (2005). 2004-2005 Annual Report. Toronto: The Queen's Printer for Ontario.
Funston, M. (2003, October 19). Environmental groups maintain homes will never be built. Retrieved March 28, 2011, from The To-
ronto Star: http://www.greenbeltontario.org/pages/torstaroct192003.htm
GOHBA. (2010, February). GOHBA appeals Ottawa urban development plans to OMB. Impact! , 16 (1).
Hamilton, S. (2007). The Ontario Municipal Board and Regulatory Capture. Halifax: Library and Archives Canada.
Legislative Assembly of  Ontario. (2000). First Session, 37th Parliament - Oak Ridges Moraine Protection and Preservation Act, 1999. 
Official Report of  Debates, Toronto.
Legislative Assembly of  Ontario. (2004). First Session, 38th Parliament - Strong Communities (Planning Ammendment) Act, 2003. 
Official Report of  Debates, Toronto.
Mackie, R. (2003, Thursday 6). McGuinty backpedals on vow. Retrieved March 28, 2011, from The Globe and Mail: 
http://www.greenbeltontario.org/pages/globenov62003.htm
Ministry of  Municipal Affairs and Housing. (2010). Citizen's Guide - Ontario Municipal Board. Toronto: Government of  Ontario.
Ministry of  Municipal Affairs and Housing. (2010). Citizens' Guide - The Planning Act. Toronto: Government of  Ontario.
Moore, A. A. (2009). Passing The Buck: The Ontario Municipal Board and Local Politicians in Toronto, 2000-2006. London: Univer-
sity of  Western Ontario.
Ontario Ministry of  Infrastructure. (2011, March 30). Places to Grow. Retrieved March 30, 2011, from 
https://www.placestogrow.ca/index.php?lang=eng
Robinson, P. (2009). Beyond a Technical Reponse: New Growth-management Experiments in Canada. In S. Davoudi, J. Crawford, & 
A. Mehmood (Eds.), Planning For Climate Change: Strategies for Mitigation and Adaptation for Spatial Planners (pp. 155-166). London, 
UK: Earthscan.
Shular, K. (2002, June 7). GTA tops $20 million in funding defenses before the OMB. Retrieved March 24, 2011, from 
MyTownCrier.ca: http://www.mytowncrier.ca/gta-tops-20-million-in-funding-defenses-before-the-omb.html
Sierra Club. (2003). Sprawl Hurts Us All! A guide to the costs of  sprawl development and how to create livable communities in On-
tario. Sierra Club of  Canada, Toronto.
Tindal, S. N., & Tindal, C. R. (2009). Local Government in Canada (Vol. 7). Toronto: Nelson.
Wekerle, G. R., & Abbruzzese, T. V. (2009). Producing regionalism: regional movements, ecosystems and equity in a fast and slow 
growth region. GeoJournal (75), 581-594.
ISSUE #2  MAY 2011
THE EVOLUTION AND CONTRADICTION OF ONTARIO’S LAND-USE OVERSIGHT MECHANISMS 
AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR URBAN SPRAWL 6
